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Abstract. Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element
rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing rela-
tions is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often
considered to be too demanding. An alternative deﬁnition of rationality of choice is that
of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged
at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this deﬁnition is well-known
under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be
the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is char-
acterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing
relations.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D11, D71.
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1 Introduction
The traditional concept of rationality of choice requires the existence of a preference
relation on the set of alternatives such that, for any feasible set of options a decision maker
may face, the set of chosen options is given by the set of greatest or maximal elements in
terms of this preference relation. The origins of this ﬁeld of rational choice and revealed
preference can be traced back to consumer theory; see, for example, Samuelson (1938;
1947, Chapter V; 1948; 1950), Houthakker (1950) and Uzawa (1971). In contrast, authors
such as Uzawa (1957), Arrow (1959), Sen (1971) and Schwartz (1976) have examined
choice situations that do not exhibit the structure that commodity spaces are endowed
with; instead, they considered more abstract situations where all ﬁnite subsets of a given
universal set may appear as feasible sets. The most ﬂexible approach, however, operates
with arbitrary domains where no restrictions whatsoever (other than non-emptiness) are
imposed on the set of choice situations that we may observe, and focuses on the logic
of rationality of choice per se. This general model of rational choice has been examined
thoroughly in contributions by Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), Suzumura (1976a;
1977; 1983, Chapter 2) and, more recently, in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005a,b;
2006) and in Bossert and Suzumura (2005).
Although greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability are
based on a sound normative foundation, these notions of rational choice are sometimes
considered too demanding, especially in social choice problems. The requirement that all
elements of a feasible set should be weakly dominated by a chosen alternative may be
rather diﬃcult to satisfy in some circumstances and, thus, we may not necessarily want
to declare an agent violating this requirement irrational . For instance, the surveys by
Camerer (1994) and Shaﬁr and Tversky (1995) report some systematic violations of the
standard revealed preference axioms in experimental settings. Thus, it is of interest to ex-
amine more modest rationality notions. One such possibility is to analyze the requirement
of non-deteriorating choice, introduced by Bossert and Sprumont (2001).
The concept of non-deteriorating choice is based on the idea that a chosen alternative
need not dominate all elements in the feasible set from which it is chosen but, instead,
should be at least as good as a reference alternative. This requirement is what is often
referred to as individual rationality but we prefer to use the term non-deteriorating choice
to avoid confusion with rationality deﬁned in terms of best or maximal elements discussed
above. To incorporate this idea in a model of choice, we assume that, in each feasible set,
there exists a reference alternative which, along with the set of feasible options, determines
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the choice of the agent. Thus, we work with a reference-dependent choice function. In
contrast to a traditional choice function which selects a subset of options from each feasible
set in its domain, a reference-dependent choice function assigns subsets of chosen options
to pairs, each of which consists of a feasible set and an alternative belonging to it. There
are several natural and plausible interpretations of such a reference alternative. In general,
it can be thought of as an alternative representing the status quo. This interpretation
is applicable in abstract choice problems (which are the ones we focus on here) but also
in more speciﬁc contexts. For example, in dynamic environments in which consecutive
choices have to be made, a plausible reference alternative at a given stage of the process
is one that has been selected in the previous stage, provided that it is still feasible in the
current stage. In an economic environment, a natural choice of a reference alternative is
an initial consumption bundle held by an agent. The potential importance of a status quo
alternative is recognized in other contributions as well; see, for instance, Zhou (1997) for
an alternative notion of rationality in such a setting. The impact of a reference alternative
on choice behaviour is also examined in Rubinstein and Zhou (1999). Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005) analyze the notion of a status-quo bias in a similar framework.
Non-deterioration can also be examined in a multi-agent setting. In that case, the
issue is not merely the existence of a single preference relation rationalizing the observed
choice in some sense but, rather, the existence of a proﬁle of preference relations that
generates the observed behaviour in accordance with some theory of collective choice. In
non-cooperative settings, Sprumont (2000) examines necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for Nash rationalizability, requiring the existence of a proﬁle of preferences deﬁned on
combinations of the players’ actions such that, for each game deﬁned by a set of feasible
actions and the restriction of these preferences to the associated combinations of feasible
actions, the set of observations corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. See
Ray and Zhou (2001) for a similar study regarding subgame-perfect equilibria.
In Bossert and Sprumont (2003), two notions that play a fundamental role in essen-
tially all cooperative approaches to collective choices are examined. These are (Pareto) eﬃ-
ciency and the above-mentioned notion of non-deterioration. Eﬃcient and non-deteriorating
choice requires the existence of a proﬁle of preference relations, one for each agent, ac-
cording to which all selected alternatives are Pareto eﬃcient and at least as good as the
reference alternative for every agent.
The existing literature on non-deteriorating choice has focused on transitive relations
as rationalizations, both in the single-agent setting and in collective choice situations.
In this paper, we examine the consequences of weakening this requirement to alterna-
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tive coherence properties and of dropping it altogether. In that sense, our contribution
parallels Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005a,b; 2006), where maximal-element ra-
tionalizability and greatest-element rationalizability by relations that are not necessarily
fully transitive are explored.
After introducing our basic deﬁnitions, we examine logical relationships between no-
tions of non-deteriorating choice that are obtained by combining coherence properties
such as transitivity with one, both, or none of the richness properties of reﬂexivity and
completeness. In particular, we consider deﬁnitions of non-deteriorating choice based on
transitive, quasi-transitive, consistent and acyclical preferences. Consistency, introduced
by Suzumura (1976b), rules out the existence of preference cycles involving at least one
strict preference. See Bossert (2006) for a survey of some recent applications of consis-
tency.
In Section 2, we introduce our notions of non-deteriorating choice, followed by an
analysis of their logical relationships. In addition, we characterize all distinct forms of
non-deterioration. Section 3 provides parallel results for the multi-agent setting.
2 Non-deteriorating choice
Consider a non-empty (but otherwise arbitrary) set of alternatives X and let X be the
set of all non-empty subsets of X. Let R ⊆ X × X be a (binary) relation on X. The
asymmetric factor P (R) of R is deﬁned by
P (R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}.
The symmetric factor I(R) of R is deﬁned by
I(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}.
The non-comparable factor N(R) of R is deﬁned by
N(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}.
If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, that is, (x, y) ∈ R means that x is consid-
ered at least as good as y, P (R), I(R) and N(R) can be interpreted as the strict preference
relation, the indiﬀerence relation and the non-comparability relation corresponding to R,
respectively. The diagonal relation on X is given by Δ = {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
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The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R on X is deﬁned as
tc(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that
x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y}.
Clearly, a relation R is transitive if and only if R = tc(R). The crucial importance of the
transitive closure tc(R) is its property of being the smallest transitive relation containing
R.
The following properties of a binary relation R are of importance in this paper.
Reﬂexivity. For all x ∈ X,
(x, x) ∈ R.
Completeness. For all x, y ∈ X such that x = y,
(x, y) ∈ R or (y, x) ∈ R.
Antisymmetry. For all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ I(R) ⇒ x = y.
Asymmetry. I(R) = ∅.
Transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ R.
Quasi-transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R)] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ P (R).
Consistency. For all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ tc(R) ⇒ (y, x) /∈ P (R).
Acyclicity. For all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ tc(P (R)) ⇒ (y, x) /∈ P (R).
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A reﬂexive and transitive relation is called a quasi-ordering and a complete quasi-ordering
is called an ordering.
We refer to reﬂexivity and completeness as richness conditions because these two
properties require that, at least, some pairs must belong to the relation. In the case
of reﬂexivity, all pairs of the form (x, x) are required to be in the relation, whereas
completeness demands that, for any two distinct alternatives x and y, at least one of
(x, y) and (y, x) must be in R. Clearly, the reﬂexivity requirement is equivalent to the set
inclusion Δ ⊆ R.
Antisymmetry requires that the relation R be a strict preference relation in the sense
that no two distinct alternatives can be considered indiﬀerent; it does, however, permit
an alternative to be indiﬀerent to itself and, thus, the property is not in conﬂict with
reﬂexivity. In contrast, asymmetry does not permit any indiﬀerence. For example, the
asymmetric factor P (R) of a relation R is asymmetric, hence its name.
Transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and acyclicity are coherence properties.
They require that if certain pairs belong to R, then certain other pairs must belong to
R as well (as is the case for transitivity and quasi-transitivity) or certain other pairs
cannot belong to R (which applies to the case of consistency and acyclicity). Quasi-
transitivity and consistency are independent. A transitive relation is quasi-transitive,
and a quasi-transitive relation is acyclical. Moreover, a transitive relation is consistent,
and a consistent relation is acyclical. The reverse implications are not true in general.
However, the discrepancy between transitivity and consistency disappears if the relation
is reﬂexive and complete; see Suzumura (1983, p.244).
Some of the arguments employed in our proofs require the axiom of choice, deﬁned as
follows.
Axiom of Choice. Suppose that T is a collection of non-empty sets. Then there exists
a function ϕ: T → ∪T∈T T such that ϕ(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ T .
An extension of a relation R is a relation R′ such that R ⊆ R′ and P (R) ⊆ P (R′). If
R′ is an ordering, it is called an ordering extension of R.
A classical theorem due to Szpilrajn (1930) establishes that any asymmetric and tran-
sitive relation has an asymmetric, transitive and complete extension. As an immediate
consequence of this fundamental theorem, any antisymmetric and transitive relation has
an antisymmetric ordering extension. See also Arrow (1951, p.64), Hansson (1968) and
Suzumura (1976b, 2004) for variants and generalizations of Szpilrajn’s theorem.
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Theorem 1 Any antisymmetric and transitive relation R on X has an antisymmetric
ordering extension.
Proof. Suppose R is antisymmetric and transitive. Let Rˆ = R \ Δ. Clearly, Rˆ is
asymmetric and transitive. By Szpilrajn’s (1930) theorem, there exists an asymmetric,
transitive and complete extension Rˆ′ of Rˆ. Letting R′ = Rˆ′ ∪ Δ, it follows immediately
that R′ is an antisymmetric ordering extension of R.
Clearly, in order to formulate a precise deﬁnition of the concept of non-deterioration,
we need to identify the reference alternative for each feasible set and, therefore, a tradi-
tional choice function that maps feasible sets into sets of chosen objects is not an adequate
description of a choice situation of that nature. To accommodate the presence of a ref-
erence alternative, we introduce the notion of a reference-dependent choice function. Let
Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S} be a non-empty domain. The interpretation of the
elements in Σ is straightforward: they represent all observable choice situations where,
for any (S, y) ∈ Σ, S is the feasible set of options and y ∈ S is the reference alternative. A
reference-dependent choice function is a mapping C: Σ → X such that, for all (S, y) ∈ Σ,
C(S, y) ⊆ S. The image of C is C(Σ) = ∪(S,y)∈ΣC(S, y).
In line with the intuitive interpretation of non-deteriorating choice given above, we say
that a reference-dependent choice function C is ND-rationalizable if and only if there exists
an antisymmetric relation R on X such that, for all (S, y) ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ C(S, y),
(x, y) ∈ R.
A relation R with this property is said to be an ND-rationalization of C or, alternatively,
C is ND-rationalized by R.
The antisymmetry assumption imposed on R is intended to avoid degenerate situ-
ations. Without a restriction such as antisymmetry, the concept of non-deterioration
becomes vacuous: any reference-dependent choice function would be declared to be
ND-rationalizable if we were to permit the universal indiﬀerence relation—the relation
R = X × X—as a potential ND-rationalization. Although representing a rather weak
notion of rationality even if antisymmetry is imposed on an ND-rationalization, non-
deterioration as deﬁned above is not a vacuous concept. For instance, suppose that
X = {x, y}, Σ = {({x, y}, x), ({x, y}, y)}, C({x, y}, x) = {y} and C({x, y}, y) = {x}.
Clearly, ND-rationalizability requires the existence of an antisymmetric relation R such
that (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R which is an immediate contradiction to the antisymmetry
assumption.
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Depending on whether one, both or none of the two richness properties and one or
none of the four coherence requirements are imposed in addition to ND-rationalizability,
we obtain diﬀerent versions of rationalizability in the sense of non-deteriorating choice.
For simplicity of presentation, we use the following convention when identifying a rational-
izability axiom. ND-rationalizability is abbreviated by ND, R stands for reﬂexivity and
C is completeness. Transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and acyclicity are denoted
by T, Q, S and A, respectively. If none of the properties is required, this is denoted by
using the symbol ∅. Formally, a rationalizability property is identiﬁed by an expression
of the form ND-β-γ, where β ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅} and γ ∈ {T,Q,S,A, ∅}. For example,
ND-rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation is denoted by ND-
RC-T, ND-rationalizability by a complete relation is ND-C-∅, ND-rationalizability by a
reﬂexive and consistent relation is ND-R-S and ND-rationalizability without any further
properties of a rationalizing relation is ND-∅-∅.
There are, in principle, 4 · 5 = 20 versions of ND-rationalizability according to this
classiﬁcation. It turns out, however, that there remain merely two distinct ones because
many of them are equivalent, even on arbitrary domains. This is in stark contrast with the
results obtained for greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizabil-
ity, where eleven and four distinct versions, respectively, can be identiﬁed; see Bossert and
Suzumura (2005) for details. Thus, we can think of this notion as being remarkably robust
with respect to the additional properties that are imposed on an ND-rationalization.
Before stating a formal result regarding the logical relationships between all of our
notions of ND-rationalizability, we provide a preliminary observation which is analogous
to the relationship between the direct revealed preference relation of a choice function
and any greatest-element rationalization thereof. Analogously to the direct revealed pref-
erence relation associated with a traditional choice function, we deﬁne the relation RC
corresponding to a reference-dependent choice function C: Σ → X by
RC = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | ∃S ∈ X such that (S, y) ∈ Σ and x ∈ C(S, y)}.
As is the case for the direct revealed preference relation of a standard choice function, any
ND-rationalization of a reference-dependent choice function C must respect the relation
RC .
Theorem 2 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S} and R is a relation on X. If R
is an ND-rationalization of C, then RC ⊆ R.
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Proof. Suppose that R is an ND-rationalization of C and x, y ∈ X are such that (x, y) ∈
RC . By deﬁnition of RC , there exists S ∈ X such that (S, y) ∈ Σ and x ∈ C(S, y).
Because R is an ND-rationalization of C, this implies (x, y) ∈ R.
The following theorem shows that the only distinction to be made between our diﬀerent
notions of ND-rationalizability is whether an ND-rationalization possesses any of the
coherence properties of transitivity, consistency, quasi-transitivity or acyclicity: as soon
as one of these conditions is satisﬁed, all of them are. Moreover, both reﬂexivity and
completeness are redundant because any notion of ND-rationalizability without these
richness properties is equivalent to that obtained by adding both of them. For convenience,
we employ the following diagrammatic representation throughout the paper. All axioms
that are depicted within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one
box b to another box b′ indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b′, and the converse
implication is not true. In addition, of course, all implications resulting from chains of
arrows depicted in such a diagram are valid.
Theorem 3 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. Then
ND-RC-T,ND-C-T,ND-R-T,ND-∅-T,
ND-RC-S,ND-C-S,ND-R-S,ND-∅-S,
ND-RC-Q,ND-C-Q,ND-R-Q,ND-∅-Q,
ND-RC-A,ND-C-A,ND-R-A,ND-∅-A
↓
ND-RC-∅, ND-C-∅, ND-R-∅, ND-∅-∅
Proof. To establish the theorem, we need to show that the properties in each of the two
boxes are equivalent and, furthermore, that the implication indicated by the arrow in the
theorem statement is strict; it is obvious that the implication itself is true.
(a) We ﬁrst prove the equivalence of the axioms in the top box. To do so, it clearly
is suﬃcient to show that ND-∅-A implies ND-RC-T. Suppose R is an acyclical ND-
rationalization of C. Consider the transitive relation tc(R) ∪ Δ. We ﬁrst prove that
tc(R) ∪Δ is antisymmetric. By way of contradiction, suppose this is not the case. Then
there exist x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ I(tc(R)∪Δ) and x = y. Because x = y, (x, y) ∈ Δ
and, thus, by deﬁnition of R, there exist K,L ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK , y0, . . . , yL ∈ X such
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that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = y = y0, (y−1, y) ∈ R for all
 ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = x. Clearly, we can, without loss of generality, assume that the
xk are pairwise distinct and, analogously, the y are pairwise distinct. Because R is an
ND-rationalization of C and, thus, antisymmetric, it follows that (xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (y−1, y) ∈ P (R) for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L}. But this contradicts the
acyclicity of R. Therefore, R is antisymmetric.
By Theorem 1, tc(R) ∪ Δ has an antisymmetric ordering extension R′. To complete
the proof that R′ is an ND-rationalization of C, suppose that x ∈ X and (S, y) ∈ Σ are
such that x ∈ C(S, y). By deﬁnition of RC , this implies (x, y) ∈ RC . Using Theorem
2, the deﬁnition of the transitive closure of a relation and the deﬁnition of R′, we have
RC ⊆ R ⊆ tc(R) ⊆ tc(R) ∪Δ ⊆ R′. Thus, (x, y) ∈ R′.
(b) To prove the equivalence of the axioms in the second box, it suﬃces to show that
ND-∅-∅ implies ND-RC-∅. Let R be an ND-rationalization of C.
If R is complete, the relation R′ = R ∪ Δ clearly is a reﬂexive and complete ND-
rationalization of C.
Now suppose R is not complete. Let T = {{x, y} | (x, y) ∈ N(R) and x = y}. Because
R is not complete, it follows that T = ∅. By the axiom of choice, there exists a function
ϕ: T → ∪T∈T T such that ϕ(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ T . Let
R′ = R ∪Δ ∪ {(ϕ({x, y}), z) | {x, y} ∈ T and {x, y} \ {ϕ({x, y})} = {z}} .
Clearly, R′ is reﬂexive and complete. To see that R′ is antisymmetric, note that the three
relations, the union of which constitutes R′, are antisymmetric and the relation
{(ϕ({x, y}), z) | {x, y} ∈ T and {x, y} \ {ϕ({x, y})} = {z}}
only contains pairs of distinct elements that are non-comparable according to R ∪Δ. To
complete the proof that R′ is an ND-rationalization of C, suppose x ∈ X and (S, y) ∈ Σ
are such that x ∈ C(S, y). Because R is an ND-rationalization of C, it follows that
(x, y) ∈ R and, because R ⊆ R′ by deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ R′.
(c) To see that the implication in the theorem statement is strict, consider the fol-
lowing example. Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = {(S,w) | S ∈ X and w ∈ S}, and deﬁne a
reference-dependent choice function C: Σ → X by C({x, y}, y) = {x}, C({x, z}, x) = {z},
C({y, z}, z) = {y} and C(S,w) = {w} for all (S,w) ∈ Σ\{({x, y}, y), ({x, z}, x), ({y, z}, z)}.
This reference-dependent choice function is ND-rationalized by the (antisymmetric) rela-
tion
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (y, y), (y, z), (z, x), (z, z)}
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and, therefore, C satisﬁes ND-∅-∅. By way of contradiction, suppose that C satisﬁes
ND-∅-A and let R′ be an acyclical ND-rationalization of C. It follows that we must have
(x, y) ∈ R′ because x ∈ C({x, y}, y), (y, z) ∈ R′ because y ∈ C({y, z}, z) and (z, x) ∈ R′
because z ∈ C({x, z}, x). Because ND-rationalizability requires that R′ is antisymmetric,
it follows that (x, y) ∈ P (R′), (y, z) ∈ P (R′) and (z, x) ∈ P (R′), contradicting the
acyclicity of R′.
The reference-dependent choice function employed in Part (c) of the above proof is
deﬁned on the full domain {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. Therefore, the logical relationships
displayed in the theorem statement (in particular, the strict implication) remain true even
if the domain Σ is assumed to be extremely rich.
We now provide characterizations of the two distinct notions of ND-rationalizability
identiﬁed in the above theorem. We begin with a characterization of the properties in
the top box of Theorem 3, which is due to Bossert and Sprumont (2001). Analogously to
the congruence axiom of Richter (1966), we deﬁne a variant that is suitable for reference-
dependent choice functions.
Reference-dependent congruence. For all S ∈ X and for all x, y ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ tc(RC) and (S, x) ∈ Σ and x = y] ⇒ y ∈ C(S, x).
As in the case of the congruence axiom deﬁned for choice functions, reference-dependent
congruence ensures that chains of preference according to RC are respected. This axiom
is necessary and suﬃcient for ND-rationalizability on any domain.
Theorem 4 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes ND-β-γ for any
β ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅} and any γ ∈ {T,Q,S,A} if and only if C satisﬁes reference-dependent
congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 3, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of ND-∅-T and
reference-dependent congruence.
Suppose ﬁrst that C satisﬁes ND-∅-T and that R is a transitive ND-rationalization
of C. By way of contradiction, suppose that reference-dependent congruence is violated.
Then there exist S ∈ X and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC), (S, x) ∈ Σ, x = y
and y ∈ C(S, x). By deﬁnition, (y, x) ∈ RC and, by Theorem 2, (y, x) ∈ R. Because
(x, y) ∈ tc(RC), there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC
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for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. Using Theorem 2 again, we obtain (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and, because R is transitive, (x, y) ∈ R. Because x = y by assumption,
this contradicts the antisymmetry of R.
Now suppose C satisﬁes reference-dependent congruence. We complete the proof by
establishing that the transitive relation R = tc(RC) is an ND-rationalization of C. To
show that R = tc(RC) is antisymmetric, suppose, to the contrary, that there exist x, y ∈ X
such that x = y and (x, y) ∈ I(R) = I(tc(RC)). Then there exist K,L ∈ N, x0, . . . , xK ∈
X and y0, . . . , yL ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK =
y = y0, (y−1, y) ∈ R for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = x. Clearly, we can, without loss of
generality, assume that the xk are pairwise distinct and that the y are pairwise distinct.
Thus, yL−1 = yL = x. By deﬁnition, (x, yL−1) ∈ tc(RC) and there exists S ∈ X such
that (S, x) ∈ Σ and yL−1 ∈ C(S, x), contradicting reference-dependent congruence. To
complete the proof, note that x ∈ C(S, y) for some x ∈ X and (S, y) ∈ Σ immediately
implies (x, y) ∈ RC ⊆ tc(RC) = R.
Our next task is the characterization of the remaining four (equivalent) notions of ND-
rationalizability. The following axiom of weak reference-dependent congruence is obtained
from reference-dependent congruence by replacing the transitive closure of RC with RC
itself.
Weak reference-dependent congruence. For all S ∈ X and for all x, y ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ RC and (S, x) ∈ Σ and x = y] ⇒ y ∈ C(S, x).
Interestingly, whereas the analogous weakening of Richter’s (1966) congruence axiom is
not a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the greatest-element rationalizability of a
traditional choice function (see Richter, 1971), weak reference-dependent congruence can
be used to provide a characterization of the ND-rationalizability of a reference-dependent
choice function in the absence of any coherence property.
Theorem 5 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes ND-β−∅ for any
β ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅} if and only if C satisﬁes weak reference-dependent congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 3, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of ND-∅-∅ and weak
reference-dependent congruence.
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Suppose ﬁrst that C satisﬁes ND-∅-∅ and that R is an ND-rationalization of C. By
way of contradiction, suppose that weak reference-dependent congruence is violated. Then
there exist S ∈ X and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC , (S, x) ∈ Σ, x = y and y ∈ C(S, x).
By deﬁnition, (y, x) ∈ RC and, by Theorem 2, (y, x) ∈ R. Invoking Theorem 2 again, the
assumption (x, y) ∈ RC implies (x, y) ∈ R and, because x = y, we obtain a contradiction
to the antisymmetry of R.
Now suppose C satisﬁes weak reference-dependent congruence. We prove that R = RC
is an ND-rationalization of C. To show that R = RC is antisymmetric, suppose, to the
contrary, that there exist x, y ∈ X such that x = y and (x, y) ∈ I(R) = I(RC). Because
(y, x) ∈ RC , there exists S ∈ X such that (S, x) ∈ Σ and y ∈ C(S, x). Thus, we have
(x, y) ∈ RC , (S, x) ∈ Σ, x = y and y ∈ C(S, x), contradicting weak reference-dependent
congruence. To complete the proof, note that x ∈ C(S, y) for some x ∈ X and (S, y) ∈ Σ
immediately implies (x, y) ∈ RC .
3 Eﬃcient and non-deteriorating choice
We now move on to a discussion of non-deteriorating choice in a multi-agent environment.
In the case of theories of collective choice, a test of a particular theory (or a class of
theories) involves not only a single relation that rationalizes the observed choices according
to a particular notion of rationalizability but, instead, an entire proﬁle of preference
relations, one relation for each member of society.
Our approach follows that of Bossert and Sprumont (2003) which focuses on two cen-
tral features of cooperative collective choice. In addition to requiring reference-dependent
choices to be non-deteriorating for each agent, they must be eﬃcient according to the
rationalizing proﬁle of individual preferences. Both of these properties are of fundamental
importance in many applications; for instance, studying non-deteriorating and eﬃcient
behaviour is essential in developing testable restrictions of prominent concepts such as
the core and the set of Walrasian equilibria in an exchange economy; see, for instance,
Brown and Matzkin (1996) and Bossert and Sprumont (2002). As we do throughout this
paper, we will, however, focus on abstract choice problems in order to provide the most
general treatment.
Suppose there is a set {1, . . . , n} of n ∈ N \ {1} agents. A reference-dependent choice
function C on an arbitrary domain is deﬁned as in the single-agent case discussed in the
previous section. Analogously, the deﬁnition of the relation RC is unchanged. However,
the notion of rationalizability we examine now diﬀers from that of ND-rationalizability:
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instead of merely considering non-deteriorating choice, we now analyze eﬃcient and
non-deteriorating choice. We say that a reference-dependent choice function C is E-
rationalizable if and only if there exists a proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) of antisymmetric relations
on X such that, for all (S, y) ∈ Σ, for all x ∈ C(S, y) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x, y) ∈ Ri (1)
and, for all (S, y) ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ C(S, y),
{z ∈ S | (z, x) ∈ P (Ri) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} = ∅. (2)
A proﬁle of antisymmetric relations with these properties is said to be an E-rationalization
of C or, alternatively, C is E-rationalized by the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn). Ri being antisym-
metric for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (2) can be equivalently written as follows:
{z ∈ S \ {x} | (z, x) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} = ∅ (3)
The eﬃciency requirement (2) or, equivalently, (3) by itself does not impose any restric-
tions. For any reference-dependent choice function C, let R1 be an arbitrary antisymmet-
ric relation and deﬁne
Ri = {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ R1}
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, that is, each Ri with i ∈ {2, . . . , n} is given by the inverse of R1.
Clearly, all elements of X are eﬃcient for this proﬁle and, thus, (3) is satisﬁed for any
reference-dependent choice function C.
Interestingly, when combined with the non-deterioration requirement (1), eﬃciency
does impose further restrictions. For example, let X = {x, y, z}, Σ = {(X, y), (X, z)},
C(X, y) = {x} and C(X, z) = {y}. Clearly, there exists a proﬁle of antisymmetric
relations (R1, . . . , Rn} such that (1) is satisﬁed (letting, for instance, Ri = {(x, y), (y, z)}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} will do) but any such proﬁle must be such that (x, y) ∈ Ri for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} because x ∈ C(X, y). But this contradicts eﬃciency because x ∈ X \ {y}
and y ∈ C(X, z).
We now analyze the possible notions of E-rationalizability that are obtained by adding
our combinations of richness and coherence properties. For β ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅} and γ ∈
{T,Q,S,A, ∅}, E-β-γ denotes E-rationalizability by a relation satisfying the richness
property or properties represented by β and the coherence property identiﬁed by γ.
As a preliminary observation, we note that any E-rationalization (R1, . . . , Rn) of a
reference-dependent choice function C must be such that all relations Ri respect the
relation RC ; this result is parallel to Theorem 2. Eﬃciency is not required for this
implication—it is suﬃcient to assume that (1) is satisﬁed.
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Theorem 6 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S} and (R1, . . . , Rn) is a proﬁle of
antisymmetric relations on X. If C and (R1, . . . , Rn) are such that (1) is satisﬁed, then
RC ⊆
⋂n
i=1 Ri.
Proof. Suppose that C and (R1, . . . , Rn) are such that (1) is satisﬁed and x, y ∈ X are
such that (x, y) ∈ RC . By deﬁnition of RC , there exists S ∈ X such that (S, y) ∈ Σ and
x ∈ C(S, y). By (1), this implies (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Analogously to our procedure employed for the single-agent case, we now examine
the logical relationships between the various notions of E-rationalizability on arbitrary
domains. As a preliminary observation, note that the distinction between transitivity
and quasi-transitivity disappears in the presence of antisymmetry and, analogously, con-
sistency and acyclicity are equivalent for antisymmetric relations. We provide a formal
statement of this result for future reference but do not present the straightforward proof.
Theorem 7 Suppose R is an antisymmetric relation on X.
(i) If R is quasi-transitive, then R is transitive.
(ii) If R is acyclical, then R is consistent.
We now prove that, out of a possible twenty, only four distinct versions of E-rationalizability
exist.
Theorem 8 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. Then
E-RC-T,E-C-T,E-RC-S,E-C-S,
E-RC-Q,E-C-Q,E-RC-A,E-C-A
↓
E-R-T, E-∅-T, E-R-Q, E-∅-Q
↓
E-R-S, E-∅-S, E-R-A, E-∅-A
↓
E-RC-∅, E-C-∅, E-R-∅, E-∅-∅
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Proof. The implications in the theorem statement are straightforward. Thus, it remains
to establish the equivalences in each of the four boxes and to provide three examples
showing that the implications are strict.
(a) By Theorem 7, E-RC-A and E-RC-S are equivalent. Furthermore, because
consistency and transitivity coincide in the presence of reﬂexivity and completeness, E-
RC-S and E-RC-T are equivalent. Thus, in order to establish the equivalences in the
ﬁrst box, it is suﬃcient to prove that E-C-A implies E-RC-A. Let (R1, . . . , Rn) be an
E-rationalization of C such that the Ri are complete and acyclical. Letting R
′
i = Ri ∪Δ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it is immediate that each R′i is reﬂexive, complete and acyclical and
(R′1, . . . , R
′
n) is an E-rationalization of C.
(b) Given Part (i) of Theorem 7, the equivalence of the axioms in the second box
follows as soon as we establish that E-∅-Q implies E-R-Q. As in (a), it is straightforward
to see that if (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C and the Ri are quasi-transitive, then
(R1∪Δ, . . . , Rn∪Δ) is an E-rationalization of C and Ri∪Δ is reﬂexive and quasi-transitive
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(c) Analogously, the equivalence of the axioms in the third box follows from Part (ii)
of Theorem 7 and the observation that if (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C with
acyclical relations Ri, then (R1 ∪ Δ, . . . , Rn ∪ Δ) is an E-rationalization of C such that
Ri ∪Δ is reﬂexive and acyclical for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(d) To show that the axioms in the last box are equivalent, it is suﬃcient to prove
that E-∅-∅ implies E-RC-∅. Suppose (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C.
If Ri is complete for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the proﬁle (R′1, . . . , R′n) obtained by letting
R′i = Ri ∪ Δ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} clearly is an E-rationalization of C and the R′i are
reﬂexive and complete.
Now suppose there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ri is not complete. Let N ⊆
{1, . . . , n} be the set of individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ri is incomplete. Clearly,
N is non-empty by assumption, and it may coincide with the entire set {1, . . . , n}. Let
m = |N | ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the number of elements in N and suppose, without loss of
generality, that N = {1, . . . , m}. Deﬁne R′j = Rj ∪Δ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {1, . . . , m}.
Clearly, R′j is reﬂexive, complete and antisymmetric for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {1, . . . , m}.
Let
R01 = R1∪Δ∪{(x, y) ∈ N(R1) | (y, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{1, . . . , m} and x = y}.
If R01 is complete, let R
′
1 = R
0
1. It is evident that R
′
1 is reﬂexive and complete. To
establish that R′1 is antisymmetric, observe ﬁrst that R1 is antisymmetric by assumption
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and Δ is trivially antisymmetric. Furthermore, if (y, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \
{1, . . . , m} for any two distinct alternatives x and y, then the antisymmetry of the relations
R′j implies that we cannot have (x, y) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {1, . . . , m} and, thus,
the relation {(x, y) ∈ N(R1) | (y, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{1, . . . , m} and x = y} is
antisymmetric as well. Finally, note that the latter relation only contains pairs that are
non-comparable according to R1 ∪Δ.
If R01 is not complete, deﬁne T1 = {{x, y} | (x, y) ∈ N(R01)}. Because R01 is not
complete, it follows that T1 = ∅. By the axiom of choice, there exists a function ϕ1: T1 →
∪T∈T1T such that ϕ1(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ T1. Let
R′1 = R
0
1 ∪ {(ϕ1({x, y}), z) | {x, y} ∈ T1 and {x, y} \ {ϕ1({x, y})} = {z}} .
Clearly, R′1 is reﬂexive and complete. To see that R
′
1 is antisymmetric, note that the two
relations, the union of which constitutes R′1, are antisymmetric and that the second of
these relations only contains pairs of distinct elements that are non-comparable according
to R01.
If m = 1, we have deﬁned a proﬁle (R′1, . . . , R
′
n) of reﬂexive, complete and antisym-
metric relations. If m > 1, we deﬁne the relations R′2, . . . , R
′
m iteratively as follows. Let
i ∈ {2, . . . , m}, and suppose R′j has been deﬁned for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} (note that R′j
is already deﬁned for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {1, . . . , m}). Deﬁne
R0i = Ri∪Δ∪{(x, y) ∈ N(Ri) | (y, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i, . . . ,m} and x = y}.
If R0i is complete, let R
′
i = R
0
i . The proof that R
′
i is reﬂexive, complete and antisym-
metric is identical to that establishing these properties for R′1.
If R0i is not complete, deﬁne Ti = {{x, y} | (x, y) ∈ N(R0i )}. Because R0i is not
complete, it follows that Ti = ∅. By the axiom of choice, there exists a function ϕi: Ti →
∪T∈TiT such that ϕi(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ Ti. Let
R′i = R
0
i ∪ {(ϕi({x, y}), z) | {x, y} ∈ Ti and {x, y} \ {ϕi({x, y})} = {z}} .
Again, that R′i is reﬂexive, complete and antisymmetric follows from the same argument
as that employed to establish these properties for R′1.
We have now deﬁned a proﬁle (R′1, . . . , R
′
n) of reﬂexive, complete and antisymmetric
relations. To complete the proof that this proﬁle is an E-rationalization of C, it has to
be shown that (1) and (3) are satisﬁed.
To establish (1), suppose x ∈ X and (S, y) ∈ Σ are such that x ∈ C(S, y). Because
(R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C, it follows that (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and, because Ri ⊆ R′i by deﬁnition, we obtain (x, y) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Finally, we show that (3) is satisﬁed. By way of contradiction, suppose there exist
(S, y) ∈ Σ, x ∈ C(S, y) and z ∈ S \ {x} such that (z, x) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Because z = x, (z, x) ∈ Δ.
If (z, x) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we immediately obtain a contradiction to the
assumption that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C.
If there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (z, x) ∈ R0i \(Ri∪Δ), it follows that (x, z) ∈ R′j
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, . . . ,m}. Because (z, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i, . . . ,m}
by assumption, this contradicts the antisymmetry of these relations.
The last remaining possibility is that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (z, x) ∈
R′i \ R0i . Let k = max {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | (z, x) ∈ R′i \ R0i }. Because (z, x) ∈ R0k, it follows
that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {k, . . . ,m} such that (z, x) ∈ R′j, contradicting our
hypothesis that (z, x) ∈ R′j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(e) We now show that the ﬁrst implication in the theorem statement is strict. To
do so, we employ an example used in Bossert and Sprumont (2003) which, in turn, is
an adaptation of an example developed in Sprumont (2001) in a diﬀerent context. Let
X = {x1, . . . , xn+1, y1, . . . , yn+1} and
Σ =
n+1⋃
j=1
{
({x1, . . . , xn+1, yj}, yj), ({xj, yj}, yj)} .
Deﬁne a reference-dependent choice function C by
C({x1, . . . , xn+1, yj}, yj) = {x1, . . . , xn+1} \ {xj} and C({xj, yj}, yj) = {yj}
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}. C is E-rationalized by the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) of transitive
relations given by
Ri =
{
(xj, yk) | j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} and j = k} ∪ {(yj, yj) | j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} but there exists no E-rationalization of C that is composed of
orderings. To verify this fact by way of contradiction, suppose (R′1, . . . , R
′
n) is an E-
rationalization of C and the R′i are orderings on X. Because these relations are an-
tisymmetric orderings, it follows that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a unique
x∗i ∈ {x1, . . . , xn+1} such that (xj, x∗i ) ∈ R′i for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}, that is, x∗i is
the worst element in {x1, . . . , xn+1} according to R′i. Because the number of agents n
is less than the number of elements n + 1 in {x1, . . . , xn+1}, there exists at least one
k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} such that xk is not the worst element in {x1, . . . , xn+1} for any of
the agents. Thus, we have (xk, x∗i ) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By (1), (x∗i , yk) ∈ R′i
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Transitivity implies (xk, yk) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because
yk ∈ C({xk, yk}, yk), this contradicts the eﬃciency requirement (3).
(f) To show that the second implication is strict, consider the following example. Let
X = {x, y, z}, Σ = {({x, y}, y), ({x, z}, z), ({y, z}, z)}, C({x, y}, y) = {x}, C({x, z}, z) =
{z} and C({y, z}, z) = {y}. This reference-dependent choice function is E-rationalized
by the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) of consistent relations deﬁned by
Ri = {(x, y), (y, z), (z, z)}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By way of contradiction, suppose (R′1, . . . , R′n) is an E-rationalization
of C with transitive relations R′1, . . . , R
′
n. By (1), we must have (x, y) ∈ R′i and (y, z) ∈ R′i
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} because x ∈ C({x, y}, y) and y ∈ C({y, z}, z). Transitivity implies
(x, z) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which contradicts (3) because z ∈ C({x, z}, z) and
x ∈ {x, z} \ {z}.
(g) Finally, we show that the last implication is strict. Let X = {x, y, z} and
Σ = {({x, y}, y), ({x, z}, x), ({y, z}, z)}, and deﬁne a reference-dependent choice func-
tion C: Σ → X by C({x, y}, y) = {x}, C({x, z}, x) = {z} and C({y, z}, z) = {y}. This
reference-dependent choice function is E-rationalized by the proﬁle (R1, . . . , Rn) such that
Ri = {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By way of contradiction, suppose (R′1, . . . , R′n) is an E-rationalization
of C that is composed of acyclical relations. By (1), it follows that we must have, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (x, y) ∈ R′i because x ∈ C({x, y}, y), (y, z) ∈ R′i because y ∈ C({y, z}, z)
and (z, x) ∈ R′i because z ∈ C({x, z}, x). By antisymmetry, it follows that (x, y) ∈ P (R′i),
(y, z) ∈ P (R′i) and (z, x) ∈ P (R′i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, contradicting the acyclicity of the
R′i.
Our next task is the characterization of the various notions of E-rationalizability distin-
guished in the above theorem. We provide characterizations of the three weakest versions.
Interestingly, while the previously discussed single-agent versions of ND-rationalizability
are relatively straightforward to characterize if the rationalizing relation is required to
be an ordering and diﬃculties typically arise if weaker coherence properties are imposed,
the opposite is true for E-rationalizability: except for special cases in which the strongest
notion of E-rationalizability coincides with the second-strongest version, the characteri-
zation of this property is an open problem. We provide a discussion of this issue following
our characterization results.
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A condition that is necessary and suﬃcient for E-∅-T and its equivalent properties is
obtained by a natural extension of reference-dependent congruence.
Extended reference-dependent congruence. For all (S, z) ∈ Σ and for all x, y ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ tc(RC) and x ∈ S and x = y] ⇒ y ∈ C(S, z).
In addition to the restrictions imposed by reference-dependent congruence (which is the
special case of this axiom obtained for z = x), extended reference-dependent congruence
requires that if there is a chain of preferences involving distinct elements according to RC ,
then the last element in the chain cannot be chosen if the ﬁrst element of the chain is
feasible; this applies even if the ﬁrst element of the chain is not the reference alternative.
Clearly, this additional requirement is imposed by the conjunction of transitivity, non-
deterioration and eﬃciency: transitivity and non-deterioration require that this chain of
preferences be respected by all individual relations in the rationalizing proﬁle and, in
turn, eﬃciency rules out the choice of the last element in the chain in the presence of
the ﬁrst element. The following characterization follows from a result due to Bossert and
Sprumont (2003).
Theorem 9 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes any of E-R-T,
E-∅-T, E-R-Q, E-∅-Q if and only if C satisﬁes extended reference-dependent congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 8, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of E-∅-T and extended
reference-dependent congruence.
Suppose ﬁrst that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C such that the Ri are
transitive. By way of contradiction, suppose there exist (S, z) ∈ Σ and x, y ∈ X such
that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC), x ∈ S, x = y and y ∈ C(S, z). Thus, there exist K ∈ N and
x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. By
Theorem 6, (xk−1, xk) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because the Ri are transitive, it follows
that (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} which, together with the assumptions x ∈ S, x = y
and y ∈ C(S, z), contradicts (3).
Now suppose C satisﬁes extended reference-dependent congruence. Let
Ri = tc(RC)
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, the Ri are transitive. We complete the proof by establishing
that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C.
The ﬁrst step in accomplishing this task is to show that Ri = tc(RC) is antisymmetric.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X such
that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y, x) ∈ tc(RC). Hence, there exist K,L ∈ N, x0, . . . , xK ∈ X
and y0, . . . , yL ∈ X such that x = x0, (xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, xK = y = y0,
(y−1, y) ∈ RC for all  ∈ {1, . . . , L} and yL = x. Without loss of generality, suppose
yL−1 = x (if not, replace yL−1 with the highest-numbered y that is diﬀerent from x; this
is always possible because x = y). By deﬁnition, we have (x, yL−1) ∈ tc(RC). Because
(yL−1, yL) = (yL−1, x) ∈ RC , there exists S ∈ X such that (S, x) ∈ Σ and yL−1 ∈ C(S, x).
But this contradicts extended reference-dependent congruence because x ∈ S and x =
yL−1.
Finally, we prove that (1) and (3) are satisﬁed. (1) follows immediately by deﬁnition
of RC and the fact that RC ⊆ tc(RC). Now suppose, by way of contradiction, that
(3) is violated. Then there exist (S, y) ∈ Σ, x ∈ C(S, y) and z ∈ S \ {x} such that
(z, x) ∈ tc(RC), contradicting extended reference-dependent congruence.
Now we turn to a characterization of the axioms in the third box. The conjunction
of two axioms turns out to be equivalent to these notions of E-rationalizability. The ﬁrst
property is reference-dependent congruence as deﬁned earlier in the context of single-agent
non-deteriorating choice. This property is needed in order to rule out strict-preference
cycles resulting from the non-deterioration requirement. However, a second property
is needed in order to ensure that eﬃciency can be satisﬁed. This second axiom is the
weakening of extended reference-dependent congruence that is obtained if the transitive
closure of RC is replaced with RC itself.
Weak extended reference-dependent congruence. For all (S, z) ∈ Σ and for all
x, y ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ RC and x ∈ S and x = y] ⇒ y ∈ C(S, z).
Reference-dependent congruence and weak extended reference-dependent congruence
are independent. To see that reference-dependent congruence does not imply weak ex-
tended reference-dependent congruence, suppose X = {x, y, z}, Σ = {({x, y}, y), (X, y)},
C({x, y}, y) = {x} and C(X, y) = {y}. This reference-dependent choice function satisﬁes
reference-dependent congruence, as is straightforward to verify. Because x ∈ C({x, y}, y),
it follows that (x, y) ∈ RC and, together with x ∈ X \ {y} and y ∈ C(X, y), we obtain
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a violation of weak extended reference-dependent congruence. Now let X = {x, y, z},
Σ = {({x, y}, y), ({x, z}, x), ({y, z}, z)}, C({x, y}, y) = {x}, C({x, z}, x) = {z} and
C({y, z}, z) = {y}. This reference-dependent choice function satisﬁes weak extended
reference-dependent congruence. Because (x, z) ∈ tc(RC), x = z and y ∈ C({x, z}, x),
reference-dependent congruence is violated.
We now obtain the following characterization result.
Theorem 10 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes any of E-R-S,
E-∅-S, E-R-A, E-∅-A if and only if C satisﬁes reference-dependent congruence and weak
extended reference-dependent congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 8, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of E-∅-A and the
conjunction of reference-dependent congruence and weak extended reference-dependent
congruence.
Suppose ﬁrst that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C such that the Ri are
acyclical.
To show that reference-dependent congruence is satisﬁed, suppose, by way of contra-
diction, that there exist S ∈ X and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ tc(RC), (S, x) ∈ Σ,
x = y and y ∈ C(S, x). Thus, there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that x = x0,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ RC for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. By Theorem 6, (xk−1, xk) ∈ Ri for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because x = y, we can without loss of generality assume that the xk
are pairwise distinct. Thus, the antisymmetry of the Ri implies (x
k−1, xk) ∈ P (Ri) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, y ∈ C(S, x) implies (y, x) ∈ RC and, invoking Theorem 6
and antisymmetry again, it follows that (y, x) = (xK, x0) ∈ P (Ri) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
But this contradicts the acyclicity of the relations Ri.
To establish weak extended reference-dependent congruence, suppose, by way of con-
tradiction, that there exist (S, z) ∈ Σ and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC , x ∈ S, x = y
and y ∈ C(S, z). Theorem 6 implies (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because y ∈ C(S, z)
and x ∈ S \ {y}, this contradicts (3).
We now prove the reverse implication. Suppose C satisﬁes reference-dependent con-
gruence and weak extended reference-dependent congruence. We complete the proof by
establishing that RC is acyclical and that the proﬁle (RC , . . . , RC) is an E-rationalization
of C.
To establish the acyclicity of RC , suppose (x, y) ∈ tc(RC). By way of contradiction,
suppose (y, x) ∈ P (RC). Clearly, this implies x = y. Furthermore, by deﬁnition, there
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exists S ∈ X such that (S, x) ∈ Σ and y ∈ C(S, x). Because x = y, this contradicts
reference-dependent congruence.
Next, we show that RC is antisymmetric. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
there exist two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC and (y, x) ∈ RC . This
implies that there exists S ∈ X such that (S, x) ∈ Σ and y ∈ C(S, x). Together with
(x, y) ∈ RC and x = y, this contradicts reference-dependent congruence.
Finally, we prove that (1) and (3) are satisﬁed. (1) follows immediately by deﬁnition
of RC . Now suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist (S, y) ∈ Σ, x ∈ C(S, y) and
z ∈ S \ {x} such that (z, x) ∈ RC . This is an immediate contradiction to weak extended
reference-dependent congruence and, thus, (3) is satisﬁed as well.
The weakest version of E-rationalizability is characterized by weak extended reference-
dependent congruence alone. Because no coherence property is imposed in these notions
of E-rationalizability, we do not require any restrictions concerning the transitive closure
of RC . Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 11 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with an arbi-
trary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) | S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes any of E-RC-∅,
E-R-∅, E-C-∅, E-∅-∅ if and only if C satisﬁes weak extended reference-dependent con-
gruence.
Proof. By Theorem 8, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of E-∅-∅ and weak
extended reference-dependent congruence.
Suppose ﬁrst that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C. To show that weak
extended reference-dependent congruence is satisﬁed, suppose, by way of contradiction,
that there exist (S, z) ∈ Σ and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC , x ∈ S, x = y and
y ∈ C(S, z). Theorem 6 implies (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because y ∈ C(S, z)
and x ∈ S \ {y}, this contradicts (3).
Now suppose C satisﬁes weak extended reference-dependent congruence. We complete
the proof by establishing that the proﬁle (RC , . . . , RC) is an E-rationalization of C.
To show that RC is antisymmetric, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist
two distinct alternatives x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC and (y, x) ∈ RC . This implies
that there exists S ∈ X such that (S, x) ∈ Σ and y ∈ C(S, x). Together with (x, y) ∈ RC
and x = y, this contradicts weak extended reference-dependent congruence.
That (1) is satisﬁed follows immediately by deﬁnition of RC . Now suppose, by way
of contradiction, that there exist (S, y) ∈ Σ, x ∈ C(S, y) and z ∈ S \ {x} such that
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(z, x) ∈ RC . This is an immediate contradiction to weak extended reference-dependent
congruence and, thus, (3) is satisﬁed as well.
As mentioned earlier, the requirement E-RC-T and its equivalents are more complex
than the remaining notions of E-rationalizability. The reason why it is diﬃcult to obtain a
characterization result on arbitrary domains for an arbitrary set of agents and an arbitrary
universal set of alternatives is that it is not possible to formulate a condition that applies
to all combinations of the number n of agents and the cardinality |X| of the set of
alternatives. The cases where a general characterization can be formulated are those
in which E-RC-T is equivalent to E-∅-T and, thus, Theorem 9 applies. For all other
combinations of n and |X|, it is not possible to obtain necessary and suﬃcient conditions
that do not depend on n, and the formal problem that results is closely related to the
problem of determining the dimension of a quasi-ordering; see, for instance, Dushnik and
Miller (1941).
Clearly, extended reference-dependent congruence is necessary for E-RC-T because,
as shown in Theorem 9, the axiom is necessary for E-∅-T which obviously is implied
by E-RC-T. The following theorem, due to Bossert and Sprumont (2003), identiﬁes the
combinations of n and |X| for which extended reference-dependent congruence is also
suﬃcient for E-RC-T.
Theorem 12 Suppose n and X are such that |X| < 2(n + 1) and C: Σ → X is a
reference-dependent choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆ {(S, y) |
S ∈ X and y ∈ S}. C satisﬁes any of E-RC-T, E-C-T, E-RC-S, E-C-S, E-RC-Q,
E-C-Q, E-RC-A, E-C-A if and only if C satisﬁes extended reference-dependent congru-
ence.
Proof. By Theorem 8, it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to E-RC-T.
That E-RC-T implies extended reference-dependent congruence follows immediately
from Theorem 9 and the observation that E-RC-T implies E-∅-T.
Now suppose |X| < 2(n+1) and C satisﬁes extended reference-dependent congruence.
As in the proof of Theorem 9, it follows that tc(RC) ∪Δ is reﬂexive and transitive, and
the proﬁle (tc(RC) ∪Δ, . . . , tc(RC) ∪Δ) is an E-rationalization of C.
The following deﬁnitions will be used in the remainder of the proof. The dimension
of a quasi-ordering R on X is the smallest positive integer r with the property that there
exist r orderings R1, . . . , Rr whose intersection is R. For a real number α, the largest
integer less than or equal to α is denoted by [α].
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Next, we show that the dimension of tc(RC) ∪ Δ does not exceed n. If |X| ≤ 3, the
dimension of tc(RC) ∪Δ is less than or equal to two which, in turn, is less than or equal
to n. If |X| ≥ 4, Hiraguchi’s inequality (see Hiraguchi, 1955) implies that the dimension
of tc(RC)∪Δ is less than or equal to [|X|/2]. Because |X| < 2(n+1) implies [|X|/2] ≤ n,
it follows again that the dimension of tc(RC) ∪Δ is less than or equal to n.
Thus, there exist antisymmetric orderings R1, . . . , Rn (not necessarily distinct) on X
whose intersection is tc(RD) ∪ Δ. It is now straightforward to verify that the proﬁle
(R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C.
As an immediate corollary of this result and Theorem 9, it follows that E-∅-T and
E-RC-T are equivalent whenever |X| < 2(n + 1).
The above theorem is tight in the sense that the assumption |X| < 2(n + 1) cannot
be weakened: whenever |X| ≥ 2(n+1), it is possible to ﬁnd a reference-dependent choice
function C satisfying extended reference-dependent congruence and violating E-RC-T.
This observation is also due to Bossert and Sprumont (2003) and it can be proven by
employing the example of Part (e) in the proof of Theorem 8.
We conclude this section with an analysis of the consequences of a speciﬁc domain
assumption. In particular, we employ what Bossert and Sprumont (2003) refer to as
universal set domains. These domains are such that, for every reference-dependent choice
problem, the entire set X is feasible and only the reference alternative is allowed to
vary from one reference-dependent choice problem to another. Thus, Σ is a universal set
domain if and only if S = X for all (S, y) ∈ Σ.
The assumption that Σ is a universal set domain has remarkably strong consequences.
Under this assumption, all notions of E-rationalizability coincide.
Theorem 13 Suppose β, β ′ ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅}, γ, γ′ ∈ {T,Q,S,A, ∅} and C: Σ → X is a
reference-dependent choice function with a non-empty universal set domain Σ ⊆ {(X, y) |
y ∈ X}. C satisﬁes E-β-γ if and only if C satisﬁes E-β ′-γ′.
Proof. Suppose C is a reference-dependent choice function deﬁned on a universal set
domain Σ. Given that all equivalences of Theorem 8 remain valid on universal set domains,
it is suﬃcient to prove that E-∅-∅ implies E-C-T. Let (R1, . . . , Rn) be an E-rationalization
of C. Deﬁne the relation R∗ on X by
R∗ = {(x, y) | x ∈ C(Σ) and y ∈ X \ C(Σ)} .
To see that R∗ is transitive, suppose (x, y) ∈ R∗ and (y, z) ∈ R∗. By deﬁnition of R∗,
(x, y) ∈ R∗ implies y ∈ C(Σ) and (y, z) ∈ R∗ implies y ∈ C(Σ), which is impossible.
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Therefore, transitivity is vacuously satisﬁed. Analogously, the deﬁnition of R∗ immedi-
ately implies that it is impossible to have both (x, y) ∈ R∗ and (y, x) ∈ R∗ and, therefore,
R∗ is antisymmetric.
Next, we prove that RC ⊆ R∗. Suppose (x, y) ∈ RC . The deﬁnition of RC im-
plies (X, y) ∈ Σ and x ∈ C(X, y). Thus, x ∈ C(Σ). Because (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-
rationalization of C, it follows that (x, y) ∈ Ri for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If y ∈ C(Σ), there
exists z ∈ X such that (X, z) ∈ Σ and y ∈ C(X, z). Because x ∈ X \{y}, this contradicts
the eﬃciency property (3) implied by E-∅-∅. Thus, y ∈ X \ C(Σ) and, by deﬁnition,
(x, y) ∈ R∗.
Let R∗∗ be an arbitrary complete, transitive and antisymmetric relation deﬁned on
X \ C(Σ), and let R0 = R∗ ∪ R∗∗. Clearly, R0 is a transitive and antisymmetric relation
such that RC ⊆ R∗ ⊆ R0. According to the relation R0, the non-comparable pairs (x, y)
are all such that both x and y are in C(Σ).
Now let R01 be an arbitrary complete, transitive and antisymmetric relation deﬁned
on C(Σ), and let R02 = . . . = R
0
n be the inverse of R
0
1, that is,
R0i = {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ R01}
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Deﬁne
R′i = R
0 ∪R0i
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It is straightforward to verify that the R′i are complete, transitive
and antisymmetric. To conclude the proof that (R′1, . . . , R
′
n) is an E-rationalization of
C, note ﬁrst that (1) follows immediately from the observation that RC ⊆ R′i for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To establish (3), suppose x ∈ C(Σ). This implies (x, y) ∈ R∗ and thus
(x, y) ∈ R′i for all y ∈ X \ C(Σ) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and, by antisymmetry, no
y ∈ X \ C(Σ) can be such that (y, x) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, we have
(x, y) ∈ R′1 or (x, y) ∈ R′2
for all y ∈ C(Σ) \ {x} by deﬁnition and, thus, (y, x) ∈ R′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is not
possible for any y ∈ C(Σ) \ {x} either.
Our ﬁnal result provides a characterization of E-rationalizability if Σ is a universal set
domain. In this case, the relevant congruence axiom is deﬁned as follows.
Universal reference-dependent congruence. For all (X, z) ∈ Σ and for all x, y ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ RC and x = y] ⇒ y ∈ C(X, z).
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This axiom characterizes the single version of E-rationalizability that exists in the presence
of a universal set domain.
Theorem 14 Suppose C: Σ → X is a reference-dependent choice function with a non-
empty universal set domain Σ ⊆ {(X, y) | y ∈ X}. C satisﬁes E-β-γ for any β ∈
{RC,R,C, ∅} and any γ ∈ {T,Q,S,A, ∅} if and only if C satisﬁes universal reference-
dependent congruence.
Proof. By Theorem 13, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of E-∅-∅ and universal
reference-dependent congruence.
Suppose ﬁrst that (R1, . . . , Rn) is an E-rationalization of C and, by way of contra-
diction, suppose there exist (X, z) ∈ Σ and x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RC , x = y and
y ∈ C(X, z). By Theorem 6, (x, y) ∈ Ri and, by antisymmetry, (x, y) ∈ P (Ri) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because y ∈ C(X, z) and x ∈ X \ {y}, this contradicts eﬃciency.
Now suppose C satisﬁes universal reference-dependent congruence. To complete the
proof, we show that (RC , . . . , RC) is an E-rationalization of C.
First, we establish the antisymmetry of RC . Suppose (x, y) ∈ RC for two distinct
alternatives x, y ∈ X. If (X, x) ∈ Σ, it is immediate that (y, x) ∈ RC . If (X, x) ∈ Σ,
universal reference-dependent congruence implies y ∈ C(X, x).
That (1) is satisﬁed follows immediately from the deﬁnition of RC . Finally, suppose
(3) is violated. Then there exist (X, y) ∈ Σ, x ∈ C(X, y) and z ∈ X \ {x} such that
(z, x) ∈ RC . This contradicts universal reference-dependent congruence and, thus, (3) is
satisﬁed.
4 Concluding Remarks
A notion of non-deteriorating choice, which is proposed as an alternative to the traditional
notion of greatest-element rational choice and maximal-element rational choice, is char-
acterized on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations. The
logical structure of our analyses as well as the characterizing axioms, both in the context
of single-agent choice and multi-agent choice, are made parallel to the traditional ratio-
nal choice theory as much as possible with the purpose of facilitating comparisons with
the traditional theory. Except for the multi-agent non-deteriorating and eﬃcient choice
on general domains and with full transitivity of rationalizing relations, we have provided
complete characterizations of all the cases of interest, thus narrowing down the class of
problems to be explored further in the future. Among the problems we may pose in the
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context of multi-agent choice is the characterization of core rationalizability introduced by
Bossert and Sprumont (2002) in the context of two-person exchange economies, which is
a sophistication of the notion of multi-agent non-deteriorating and eﬃcient choice. Since
there are already many dishes on the table, we leave this problem for future exploration.
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